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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost every effort to protect or enhance environmental quality is 
perceived as a challenge, at least at the outset, by groups or in-
dividuals whose economic self-interest-or political beliefs-are 
threatened. 1 Similarly, almost every attempt to promote economic 
development or technological innovation is viewed as a potential in-
sult to the quality of the natural environment or a threat to the 
delicate "ecological balance" upon which we all depend.2 Environ-
mental and developmental interests, if the shorthand is permissible, 
are locked in a fierce and widening battle. 
Supported by public opinion and a sympathetic judiciary, environ-
mental groups have been able to wield substantial power.3 Although 
the extent of popular support for pollution abatement and environ-
• Associate Professor and Head, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology; B.A. 1968 Columbia University; M.C.P. 1970, Ph.D. 1973 Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology . 
•• Assistant Professor of Urban Planning, School of Architecture and Urban Planning, 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; B.A. 1967 University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1977 Boalt 
Hall Law School, University of California, Berkeley; M.C.P. 1979 Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 
1. See I. KRISTOL. Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM (1978); H. SPROUT & M. SPROUT, EN· 
VIRONMENTAL POLITICS 52-53 (1978). 
2. See T. Gladwin, The Management of Environmental Conflict: A Survey of Research Ap-
proaches and Priorities (1978) (NYU Faculty of Business Administration Working Paper 
#78-09); See also B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979), for an in-
teresting perspective on the legitimacy of "environmental opposition to development." 
3. See Bowman, The Environmental Movement: A n Assessment of Ecological Politics, 5 
ENV. AFF. 649 (1976); Marcus, The Disproportionate Power of Environmentalists, 2 HARV. 
ENV. L. REV. 583 (1977). 
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mental protection efforts has not diminished substantially, 4 govern-
ment and private industry have managed recently to win substantial 
public sympathy for their claims that environmental protectionism 
has "gone far enough."5 All the parties to environmental disputes 
now claim popular support, aggravating the intransigence of the 
contending interest groups. 
At the same time that the number and intensity of environmental 
disputes-controversies in which the use of natural resources or the 
choice of appropriate standards for environmental protection are in-
volved-have been growing, the ability of our social, political, and 
legal institutions to resolve these disputes in a timely, efficient, and 
decisive manner has diminished.6 In our pluralistic (and increasingly 
individualized)1 society, there is no longer a broad base of shared 
values. Disputes among groups with conflicting values are epidemic. 
Government seems unable to address these disputes satisfactorily; 
in part because government itself is often a party to them, but 
primarily because the vitality of our political institutions has been 
sapped by the fragmentation of political parties into shifting 
alliances that do not so much govern as react to the pressures of 
special interest groups and other organized constituencies.8 The 
resulting paralysis in government, most particularly in Congress, 
has placed an enormous burden on our legal system; a burden that, in 
the view of many qualified observers, the courts may not be able to 
handle.9 
It is in this context that we are evaluating new approaches to 
resolving environmental disputes that offer some means, in addition 
4. The continuing substantial popular support for environmental protection efforts is sum-
marized in The Public Speaks Again: A New Environmental Survey, RESOURCES 1 (No. 60 
Sept.-Nov. 1978) (Newsletters of Resources for the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C.). 
5. A number of recent events indicate this trend: the push for regulatory reform in the Con-
gress, see Regulatory Reform Passes Senate Test, N.Y. Times, December 20, 1979 at 17; the 
perception, even among environmentalists, that energy issues may overwhelm some en-
vironmental concerns, see Energy Is Key Issue Facing Sierra Club, N.Y. Times, September 
16, 1979 at 54; and a retreat from stringent environmental standards under the pressure of in-
flation, see US Lowers Sights 50% on Srrwg, Boston Globe, January 27, 1979 at 1. 
6. The seemingly unending environmental dispute has become a staple of news reporting: 
e.g., the Seabrook nuclear plant, the Tellico Dam-snail darter controversy. 
7. See, e.g., C. LASCH. THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1979). 
8. See, e.g., Broder, The Unnecessary Evil of Special-Interest Groups, Boston Sunday Globe, 
January 21, 1979 at AI; Single-Issue Lobbies Create Woes, Milwaukee Journal, October 7, 
1979 at 17. 
9. See D. HOROWITZ. THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Leventhal, Environmental Deci-
sionrI'ULking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); Cramton & Boyer, 
Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?, 2 ECOL. L. Q. 407 (1972). 
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to traditional legal or political devices, for resolving conflict. Called 
environmental dispute resolution, conflict avoidance, mediation, or 
just plain negotiation, these approaches share a critical element: 
each aims to resolve environmental disputes through out-of-court 
bargaining rather than through adversarial legal procedures. All of 
these new approaches seek to manage conflict and to foster volun-
tary agreements.10 
Efforts to avoid or resolve environmental disputes are increasing 
in number. In some instances, mediators, or neutral intervenors, are 
being called upon to facilitate dispute resolution efforts. Various 
ideas about when and how to mediate environmental disputes are be-
ing debated by practitioners in the field. ll 
It is our contention that successful environmental dispute resolu-
tion will depend on a thorough understanding of (1) the forces and 
conditions that have given rise to a search for negotiated solutions 
and (2) the unique qualities of environmental disputes that make 
their resolution difficult. We propose a series of steps to address en-
vironmental disputes, drawing heavily on the experience of the plan-
ning profession with bargaining and negotiation in public participa-
tion programs. We recognize that problems remain with our ap-
proach and consider how these may be analyzed and addressed. The 
article concludes with two steps that could be taken towards resolv-
ing remaining problems. 
A. Definitions 
In discussing the various approaches to dispute resolution it is im-
portant to distinguish among their principal features. Although 
there is, as yet, no formal definition of environmental mediation, a 
working definition has been advanced by Gerald W. Cormick, Direc-
tor of the Office of Environmental Mediation at the University of 
Washington's Institute for Environmental Studies: 
10. See text at note 12 infra. 
11. See Cormick, Mediating Environmental Controversies: Perspectives and First Ex-
perience, 3 EARTH L. J. 215 (1976); O'CONNOR, ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE STATE·OF·THE· 
ART (E.I.A. Review No.2, Oct. 1978) (published by the Laboratory of Architecture and Plan-
ning, M.I.T.); ENVIRONMENTAL COMMENT (May, 1977), which devoted its entire issue to en-
vironmental conflict resolution; ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE? 
(1978) (a report of a conference held in Reston, Virginia, January 11-13, 1978, sponsored by 
RESOLVE, Center for Environmental Conflict Resolution, The Aspen Institute for 
Humanistic Studies, and the Sierra Club Foundation) [hereafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL 
MEDIATION]; Environmental Mediators, NEWSWEEK, March 17, 1980 at 79. 
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Mediation is a voluntary process in which those involved in a 
dispute jointly explore and reconcile their differences. The 
mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. His or her 
strength lies in the ability to assist the parties in resolving their 
own differences. The mediated dispute is settled when the par-
ties themselves reach what they consider to be a workable solu-
tion.12 
In contrast to mediation, which is characterized by the use of, and 
need for, a neutral party, "negotiation" is a method for consensual 
dispute settlement in which only the principal parties participate. 
Disputants must reach a voluntary settlement themselves without 
the assistance of an intermediary. 
To avoid confusion, it is important to remember that mediation re-
quires the use of a neutral facilitator, while negotiation does not. 
Confusion arises, of course, because even in the process of mediation 
we would ordinarily say that the parties are negotiating, i.e., they 
are involved in the give-and-take of bargaining. Further adding to 
the potential for confusion is the fact that both negotiation and 
mediation may be used to resolve a particular dispute. If a negotia-
tion effort between the principal parties fails, a mediator may be in-
vited to join the discussions in the hope of achieving a settlement. To 
help keep these definitions clear, we use the word "bargaining" to 
refer to any process of discussion and compromise that leads to the 
resolution of a dispute, reserving the word "negotiation" for that 
process of dispute resolution which involves only the principal par-
ties. "Mediation" is used only to designate a process of dispute set-
tlement aided by a neutral party. 
II. THE PUSH FOR CONSENSUAL ApPROACHES TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Three factors have contributed heavily to the movement towards 
consensual approaches to resolving environmental disputes: the 
costs of environmental conflict, dissatisfaction with traditional ap-
proaches to dispute resolution, and the success of some preliminary 
efforts using consensual methods. The growth of the environmental 
movement led to the passage of federal pollution control legislation 
12. See ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION. supra note 11, at 2. Professor Lon Fuller, of Harvard 
Law School, identified the crucial role of the mediator in the process of dispute resolution: the 
mediator has the "capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on 
them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a 
perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another." Fuller, 
Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971). 
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that gave environmentalists enough legal clout to ensure that their 
concerns would not be ignored.13 The resulting conflict between 
business and environmental interests has often been quite intense. 14 
Faced with an apparent inability of courts and regulatory agencies to 
deal effectively with environmental conflicts, both sides have 
searched for alternative approaches. The potential for successful 
dispute resolution shown by some initial efforts at negotiation and 
mediation has spurred the momentum for change. 
A. The Costs of Contentiousness 
Both environmental and business interests have borne substantial 
costs directly attributable to the delays caused by extended en-
vironmental litigation and regulatory reviews. Carrying costs on 
large-scale land development projects, opportunity costs associated 
with often-delayed energy facility projects, and the inflationary im-
pact of rising materials and construction costs have fallen heavily on 
real estate developers, utility companies, and bondholders.15 En-
vironmentalists also point to the "costs" they have incurred while 
prolonged legal actions or political debates have delayed implemen-
tation of tougher codes and standards or allowed development to 
proceed in areas where the loss of habitats or species might not be 
reversed in our lifetime.16 Perhaps the most accurate assessment is 
13. By the end of the 1960's, environmentalism had clearly gathered sufficient strength and 
breadth of support to be dubbed a social movement. See Bowman, supra note 3 at 651. Fur-
ther, it was a movement with the capacity to translate the concern of its members into 
legislative action. Between 1969 and 1972, environmentalists scored numerous political vic-
tories capped by the passage of substantive federal legislation to control air and water pollu-
tion, and the halting of action on such major projects as the cross-Florida barge canal and the 
development of an American SST to compete with the Anglo-French Concorde. See W. ROSEN-
BAUM, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 6 (1977). 
14. The annual demonstrations held at the Seabrook nuclear plant construction site in the 
late 1970's were just one example. 
15. Other substantial costs for business arise from the uncertainties created by prolonged 
conflict. A company may not be able to make intelligent investment decisions when an environ-
mental dispute centers on the proposed regulatory standards for its products or processes. 
Businesses also lose substantial flexibility because capital is committed to projects that are 
tied up in extended litigation. 
16. Some of the costs to the environmental movement are less obvious. To win a small 
number of precedent-setting cases, environmental groups have devoted enormous sums of 
money to protracted litigation while other critical programs such as public education and 
political action are short changed. For example, in 1977, the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (NRDC) spent $1.5 million, more than half its budget, on environmental litigation and 
associated activities-primarily scientific support for the litigation. By contrast, NRDC's 
public education efforts received only a tenth as much money as litigation, $136,000. Similarly, 
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), in 1977, spent $854,000, slightly more than half its 
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that it is the "average" citizen who has had to shoulder all these 
costs through higher prices and increased morbidity (or mortality) 
rates. 
In a period of inflation, economic stagnation, and fiscal stringency, 
as the costs of conflict mount, businesses would prefer to avoid 
drawn-out battles that threaten their economic well-being. Indeed, 
current economic difficulties account for much of business' will-
ingness to explore consensual approaches to environmental conflict 
resolution. Conflict, and the delay it creates, simply costs too 
much. 17 
Economic factors are also turning environmental groups away 
from protracted disputes. There appears to be a growing anxiety 
about the continued willingness of the public to support environmen-
talism as the economic trade-offs become more obvious and quite 
severe. Environmentalism-like any social movement-was a 
creature of its time. Popular concern is now focused more on the 
problems of energy, inflation, and employment. IS Environmental in-
terest groups, fearing some loss of momentum, find compromise 
strategies appealing not only because they make for good public rela-
tions but also because they provide a hedge against all-out defeat in a 
"win-lose" confrontation where popular and political support may 
not be sufficient to guarantee victory.I9 
budget, on environmental litigation. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL. INC. ANNUAL 
REPORT (1978); ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND. INC. ANNUAL REPORT (1978). 
17. See, e.g., Friedman, Environmental Checklist, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE COR-
PORATE COUNSEL 335 (1978). 
18. See note 5 supra; Bowman, supra, note 3, at 657. It seems unlikely that we will again see 
anything like the federal legislative response to the emergence of the environmental move-
ment, and not merely because the need has been lessened. The Kennedy-Johnson administra-
tions-combining "New Frontier" optimism in the nation's ability to solve its problems with 
"Great Society" beliefs in new government programs and increased spending as the solution-
furnished both the precedents and momentum for the environmental legislation of the Nixon-
Ford years. Now, with government spending under attack, energy costs a primary concern, 
and inflation once again reaching double-digit levels, government programs to protect the en-
vironment will be closely scrutinized. 
19. An interesting example of the abandonment of confrontation tactics by an environmen-
tal group occurred in the summer of 1978. The Clamshell Alliance, a loose-knit federation of 
"affinity groups" and individuals protesting the construction of a nuclear power plant at 
Seabrook, N.H., had scheduled an illegal occupation of the plant site for the weekend of June 
24, 1978. Plans called for an even larger demonstration than that held the previous year when 
over 1400 protesters had been arrested. But when it became clear that these plans were 
leading to a possibly violent confrontation with state police, Clamshell leaders chose to avoid 
the conflict. Negotiations between the group's leaders and New Hampshire Attorney General 
Thomas Rath produced a compromise that gave state approval to a peaceful three-day rally 
and "energy fair" held near the plant site. Over 15,000 people attended, there was no reported 
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B. Dissatisfaction With Traditional Means 
Another factor pushing environmentalists and business interests 
toward out-of-court settlements is increasing dissatisfaction with 
traditional means of resolving conflicts. This dissatisfaction has been 
expressed largely as criticism of the role that government regulatory 
agencies and the federal courts play settling environmental and 
other disputes. 20 
The environmental protection legislation that capped the growth 
of the environmental movement in the 1960's gave federal agencies a 
major role in implementing, monitoring, and enforcing new stand-
ards established by Congress. Within a short time, the federal courts 
became deeply involved in judicial review of agency practices and, by 
liberalizing the rules of standing21 and agreeing to take a "hard 
look" at administrative decisions in environmental cases, the federal 
courts opened their doors to a flood of environmental litigation that, 
in turn, added significantly to the rights already granted by 
statute. 22 
Today, however, there is a general mood of dissatisfaction with 
both the administrative agencies and the courts. A number of critics 
have questioned the capacity of courts and government agencies to 
deal with the complexities of broad social, economic, and technical 
problems. 23 Others ask whether the "command and control" model 
trouble, and both sides seemed happy with the solution. See, Police Equipped to Handle Trou-
ble, Boston Globe, June 18, 1978; Reportfrom Seabrook, Real Paper, July 8,1978. 
20. See Discussion: Crisis in the Courts, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1978); Rifkind, Are We Asking 
Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 101 (The Pound Conference) (1976); Carter, Comment: 
The Environment-An Agency-Court Battle, 17 NAT. RES. J. 122 (1977); Overregulating the 
Regulators, N.Y. Times, December 26, 1979 at 26; Leventhal, supra note 9, at 545-50. For a 
perceptive discussion of this issue in the context of the federal courts, compare the majority 
opinion of Judge Leventhal with the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon in Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
21. See SCRAP v. United States, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 
(1972); Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. 
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law. 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1723-47 (1975). 
22. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); EDF v. 
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973); R. ANDREWS, EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE (1976); R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENT (1976). 
23. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 1772-73; Horowitz, supra note 9; Boyer, Alternatives to 
Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic and Social 
Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972); Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative 
Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1975); Bardach & Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact 
Statement vs. The Real World, 49 PUB. INT. 22 (1977). 
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of government regulation is a useful approach to protecting the en-
vironment.24 There is general agreement that current administrative 
practices and judicial approaches to environmental dispute resolu-
tion are unsatisfactory. 
A large part of the problem is that the sheer number of disputes 
that need to be resolved has placed an intolerable strain on our for-
mal mechanisms for dispute resolution. Ours has been a litigious 
society for at least the past century and one-half.25 In today's ex-
tremely pluralistic society, value conflicts are ubiquitous and, lacking 
any overriding consensus about their resolution, we have been true 
to our heritage and turned increasingly to formal legal processes for 
solutions.26 
Compounding the strain on our formal institutions is our general 
unwillingness to condone the use of raw power-whether political or 
economic-as a means of conflict resolution. Past injustices 
associated with the abuse of power have made us extremely wary of 
attempts to still opposition through force or political clout. The 
restraints placed on the blatant exercise of power by a regard for 
public opinion incline even the powerful to resolve disputes through 
formal legal institutions. 
At the same time that our courts are facing a growing number of 
disputes, the nature of these disputes has become increasingly com-
plex. Environmental disputes, in particular, are characterized by 
their scientific and technical content. Judges, lawyers, and govern-
ment officials routinely encounter questions involving the most 
sophisticated concepts in such disciplines as statistics, demo-
graphics, limnology (the study of bodies of fresh water), radiology, 
public health, and more. Even the most conscientious among them 
cannot hope to grasp more than the broad dimensions of a given 
case.27 
24. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); W. 
BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975); Breyer, Analyzing 
Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, andReform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
549, 595-597 (1979). 
25. The prevalence of "legalisms" in debate and the tendency to channel "political" 
disputes into the legal system were both noted by Tocqueville. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Bradley ed. 1946). 
26. At the heart of many environmental disputes, for example, is the erosion of belief in the 
value of economic growth. 
27. For example, in a recent case involving a claim that the city of Milwaukee was polluting 
Lake Michigan with improperly treated sewage, the trial judge had this to say about his ability 
to comprehend the complexities of the litigation. "It is well known to all of us that the arcane 
subject matter of some of the expert testimony in this case was sometimes over the heads of all 
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A less obvious, but perhaps even more important, factor con-
tributing to the complexity of environmental disputes is the nearly 
inseparable conjunction of values and facts at the heart of most 
disputes. As a society we simply fail to recognize that few "scienti-
fic" judgments are ever value-free.28 When we defer to scientists 
and technicians to sort out complex issues and make "right" deci-
sions for us, we actually obscure the debate. Discussions focus on 
supposed scientific fact while the more critical value choices underly-
ing these "facts" go unexamined. 
These quantitative and qualitative strains on the capacity of our 
legal institutions are compounded by their decisionmaking pro-
cedures. A good illustration of the problem is the way dispute resolu-
tion is constrained by the processes of our court system. 
Despite the liberalization of standing rules in recent years, courts 
still do not accept the legitimacy of the "ideological" plaintiff. This 
excludes many interested parties from direct participation in the 
courtroom, even though they may represent significant concerns 
and could furnish information and insights that might assist in 
resolving larger issues in a dispute.29 Courts are normally not in-
terested in these larger issues. Judges seek to restrict the scope of 
their decisions to the narrowest set of issues in an effort to dispose of 
the litigation before them. In the context of environmental disputes, 
such constrained judgments may leave a host of associated problems 
and concerns unresolved, opening the door to further conflict. 
of us to one height or another. I would be certainly less than candid if I did not acknowledge 
that my grasp of the testimony was less complete than I would like it to be, but short of enroll-
ing in a university course directed toward a reorientation of my entire education and spending 
the years that would involve, I know of no remedy for the problem." People of the State of Il-
linois v. City of Milwaukee, No. 72 C 1253 (N.D. Ill., July 29, 1977); see also Boyer, supra note 
23. 
28. See WHEN VALUES CONFLICT (L. Tribe, C. Schelling & J. Voss eds. 1976); B. ACKERMAN, 
S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, JR. & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR EN-
VIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974); Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Towards Legal Rightsjor 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
29. Professor Stewart notes: "There may ... be instances where only an ideological plain-
tiff, direct or surrogate, will suffice to secure representation of important affected interests. 
For example, there might be cases of environmental degradation in remote wilderness areas, 
where no individual may be able to establish material injury. Or there may be serious conflicts 
between the interests of those suffering material injury and other, more remotely involved in-
terests that should nonetheless be considered. Problems of this sort are likely to be generated 
by governmental policies that have important effects on the preferences and well-being of 
future generations ... " Stewart, supra note 21, at 1746-47. Stewart then argues that, 
despite the fact that ideological interests should, at times, be considered, their inclusion in the 
adjudicatory process through liberalization of standing rules may "strain the logic of represen-
tation, and risk turning the courts into 'planning agencies.' .. Id. at 1747. 
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Judicial interpretation of the jurisdictional requirement of a "case 
or controversy"30 further narrows the scope of formal dispute 
resolution in the courts to cases that have "ripened" and are thus 
legally recognizable. Courts simply will not address most situations 
of potential, rather than actual, conflict. This can lead to a disjointed, 
episodic, and possibly contradictory "solution" when courts address 
complex environmental disputes affecting varied interests over a 
period of time. 
Within the courtroom, the adversary system introduces an unfor-
tunate "gaming" aspect to the judicial process that discourages the 
search for "win-win" solutions to a dispute, or "joint net gains." For 
example, adversarial tactics, in conjunction with the technical rules 
for admission of evidence and testimony at trial, assure that poten-
tially useful information will be eliminated from consideration. The 
parties and their attorneys have far more-and more accurate-in-
formation than they are willing-or allowed-to communicate.31 
By limiting the access of interested parties, restricting the infor-
mation available for consideration, restricting the range of concerns 
to legally recognizable causes of action, and "segmenting" complex 
and interrelated problems into discrete legal actions, the courts 
make it practically impossible to reach a judgment that acknowl-
edges the real concerns of all interested parties. 
The strain of too many cases and too much complexity on formal 
decisionmaking processes has overloaded our legal institutions. They 
are too often inefficient, indecisive, and unable to act with dispatch. 
The prospect of lengthy and frustrating legal battles in which victory 
is seldom assured and too often Pyrrhic, combined with a growing 
recognition of the costs of protracted conflict, have accelerated the 
search for consensual approaches to environmental disputes. Pre-
30. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. 
31. See Renfrew, Settling Commercial Litigation: The Role of the Court in SETTLING COM· 
PLEX COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 72 (1978). Problems with the amount and quality of information 
available for decision making also arise in judicial review of agency actions. Reviewing courts 
are limited to examining agency decisions for legal error, deferring to the agency's judgment 
on factual matters. Despite this apparent bar to a reviewing court's consideration of the facts 
decided by the agency, one legal issue-the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, or as it 
is referred to in administrative law, the substantial evidence rule-allows the court to deter-
mine, as a matter of law, whether the agency's decision is justified in light of the amount and 
reliability of the evidence (i.e., information) available to it. The substantial evidence rule thus 
leads to an examination of factual issues by the reviewing court, but such an examination is in-
herently restricted because the court is powerless to go beyond the record of agency decision 
making, i.e., the court is attempting to evaluate the sufficiency and probity of factual matters 
without access to further information-e.g., additional research or expert testimony-that 
might assist in the evaluation. 
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scriptions for regulatory and judicial reform are emerging from 
many quarters. 32 
We believe that current dissatisfaction with traditional means of 
resolving environmental conflict is indeed appropriate, but question 
whether existing proposals for reform are a sufficient answer. It is 
our view that many environmental conflicts exceed the decision-
making capacity of our existing institutions and will require new in-
stitutional arrangements for resolution. 
C. First Efforts at Consensual Approaches 
The push for consensual methods of environmental dispute resolu-
tion has been bolstered by preliminary efforts in this direction to 
date. It appears that mediation and informal negotiation may prove 
an attractive alternative. Mediation and out-of-court negotiation 
have been able to lower the costs of dispute resolution and, sig-
nificantly, lessen the constraints imposed by traditional legal proc-
esses. Informal bargaining techniques have made it easier to tailor 
settlements to the special circumstances of each case, and "tailored" 
settlements, free from the more restricted procedures imposed by 
formal institutions, have turned win-lose confrontations into joint 
problem-solving efforts. 
An example of just such a "tailored" settlement is the agreement 
reached in late 1978 that resolved the Grayrocks Dam controversy.33 
32. The Congress and Supreme Court, for example, have both moved recently in search of a 
solution to the problem of inordinate delay in the regulatory process. In Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the 
Court opted for increased judicial deference to the agencies' choice of procedures. In a sharply 
worded opinion, Justice Rehnquist criticized the D.C. Circuit's fault-finding with NRC pro-
cedures in two power plant licensing cases as "judicial intervention run riot," describing the 
lower court's reasoning on one point as "Kafkaesque." To curb such excesses in the future, the 
Court held that reviewing courts, with rare exceptions, are not empowered to require ad-
ministrative agencies to employ procedures beyond those specified in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) or other relevant statutes. Id. at 1202; see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804 
(1978). 
While the Court is increasing judicial deference to agencies' procedural judgments-so long 
as they follow statutory authority-the Congress is seeking to remove from agencies' substan-
tive judgments the presumption of validity they have, to date, enjoyed. The so-called Bumpers 
Amendment, S. 111, 96th Congo 1st Sess. (1979), for example, would force agencies to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the validity of their regulations whenever challenged. See 
Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 AD. L. REV. 
329 (1979). 
33. See J. Wondolleck, Bargaining for the Environment: Compensation and Negotiation in 
the Energy Facility Siting Process 19-48 (June 1, 1979) (unpublished Master's Thesis, Depart-
ment of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Rare Whooping 
Crane vs. Western Power Project, Washington Post, November 27, 1978 at AI. 
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In this case, environmentalists charged that the proposed dam for an 
electric generating plant in eastern Wyoming would jeopardize the 
continued existence of the endangered Whooping Crane or adversely 
affect its critical habitat along the North Platte River in Nebraska . 
. At issue was the impact on the Whooping Cranes' habitat of the 
decreased water flows in the North Platte that would occur when the 
Grayrocks Dam and its reservoir were completed. The Whooping 
Cranes normally nest on the sand bars in the "Big Bend" area of the 
North Platte during their semi-annual migrations between the Gulf 
Coast and Canada. The "Big Bend" is particularly suitable because 
the spring floods in the North Platte each year sweep away the 
vegetation on the sand bars leaving no hiding place for possible 
predators. The birds instinctively recognize the safety provided by 
these open stretches and will not nest where tall grass or reeds pro-
vide cover for predators. The environmentalists feared that the 
Grayrocks Dam project would diminish the spring floods enough to 
prevent their scouring the sand bars and thus deter the Whooping 
Cranes from nesting at "Big Bend," with possibly serious conse-
quences for the birds' continued existence. 
A second, broader, issue was the possible impact of the decreased 
water flow on irrigation projects in Nebraska, a major concern for a 
state with an agriculture-dominated economy. Because both environ-
mentalists and state officials wanted to prevent the Grayrocks pro-
ject from siphoning too much water from the North Platte, they 
joined forces in a federal court suit against the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), 
charging that they had issued permits and loan guarantees for the 
project without having adequately considered its environmental im-
pacts. 34 
Although the State of Nebraska was initially successful in that 
litigation, the decision was appealed to the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of 
Appeals35 and it appeared that the parties would be enmeshed in a 
lengthy legal battle. The developers of the project were anxious to 
complete it on schedule, however, and to avoid the costs and delay of 
an extended court battle. After a series of negotiating sessions in-
volving all the concerned parties,36 an agreement was reached in late 
34. J. Wondolleck, supra note 33, at 24, 33·34. 
35. [d. at 35·36. 
36. [d. The parties represented in these negotiations were: the National Wildlife Federa· 
tion, the National Audubon Society, the Powder River Basin Resource Council, and the 
Laramie River Conservation Council (environmental groups); the State of Nebraska, the 
Wyoming Municipal Power Agency, the Rural Electrification Administration, the U.S. Army 
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1978 that allowed the project to go ahead while furnishing guaran-
tees to the environmentalists and Nebraska officials that water flows 
in the North Platte would remain at acceptable levels. 
This "tailored" settlement established maximum limits on water 
consumed by the Grayrocks project, specified the minimum flows to 
be maintained in the North Platte and established a monitoring 
system to confirm that the flows specified in the settlement were be-
ing met. Finally, among other provisions, the parties agreed to 
establish a trust for the purpose of funding activities to protect and 
maintain the Whooping Cranes' critical habitat along with "Big 
Bend."37 
There have been other significant successes-and some failures-
in environmental dispute resolution over the past few years.38 While 
mediation, negotiation, and other consensus-building strategies are 
not necessarily useful in all environmental conflicts-and, more im-
portantly, are not a guarantee of "good" decisions-our experience 
with these processes suggests they are useful. Our task now is to ex-
plore the problems that arise when these techniques and strategies 
are, in fact, used. 
III. THE SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN RESOLVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
Many practitioners of environmental dispute resolution have at-
tempted to describe when and how to proceed with mediation or 
negotiation.39 More often than not they have noted that (1) the 
parties-at-issue must have a strong desire to resolve their differ-
ences; (2) they must be prepared to make reasonable compromises 
and enter into written agreements if a settlement is reached; and, 
when mediation is involved (3) they must find a neutral (but con-
cerned) party capable of employing dispute resolution techniques 
and understanding the technical issues underlying the dispute.4o 
Corps of Engineers, the Land and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (government agencies); and the Basin Electrical Power Cooperative (the developer). 
37. $7.5 million has been provided in perpetuity for the trust. See, Whooping Crane Safety 
Pramised, Dam Fight Ends, Washington Post, November 28, 1978 at AI. 
38. See Cormick, supra note 11, for a published account of the settlement in the Sno-
qualmie/Snohomish case, a land use dispute involving plans for flood control in a river valley. 
For other published cases, see O'Connor, supra note 11; M. RIVKIN. NEGOTIATED DEVELOP· 
MENT: A BREAKTHROUGH IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSIES (1977); O'Connor, Resolving the 
Bachman's Warbler Controversy, Conservation News (August 1, 1977). 
39. See sources listed at note 11 supra. 
40. [d. 
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While these prescriptions are helpful, they do not speak to the very 
special difficulties involved in resolving environmental, as opposed 
to other types of, disputes. 
Some of the special problems of environmental dispute resolution 
can be highlighted by contrasting environmental disputes with col-
lective bargaining efforts in the labor relations field, long a model for 
conflict management.41 We have noted a number of properties of en-
vironmental disputes that merit special attention: "irreversible" 
ecological effects may be involved; the nature, boundaries, par-
ticipants, and costs are often indeterminate; one or more of the par-
ties to most environmental disputes often claims to represent the 
broader "public interest" (including the interests of inanimate ob-
jects, wildlife, and generations yet unborn); and implementation of 
private agreements is difficult. . 
Environmental mediation is further complicated by the fact that 
some decision-makers and a large fraction of the public-at-Iarge 
believe that environmental disputes are basically scientific disputes 
that ought to be decided by impartial referees who can sort out the 
technical issues involved and make "right" decisions on our behalf. 
It is our contention, however (and this is a view shared by others), 
that environmental disputes are at least as much value disputes as 
scientific controversies. It is the fact that there is confusion over 
whether environmental disputes are "different" or not that creates a 
special problem.42 
41. See ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION, supra note 11, at 2-3. Before noting the many dif-
ferences between environmental and labor-management disputes that make resolution of the 
former so difficult, we should note what elements they share. If there is not a significant 
overlap between these two cases, it would be futile to contrast their differences. 
In both cases, the parties must be willing to agree that their goal is to reach a decision 
through compromise; they should not view bargaining as a "stalling" tactic that will enable 
them to hold out for an extreme position, or agree to a settlement that they know to be un-
workable. The parties must also stand in some relative balance of power. There can be no 
meaningful bargaining or compromise if one party has nothing to trade. In both cases, media-
tion involves the use of third-party intervenors who work from an impartial base, The neutrali-
ty and impartiality of the mediator is critical whether it is a labor or environmental dispute. 
Thus, whether it be an environmental or labor-management conflict, bargaining efforts re-
quire and share these common elements: parties with something to trade and a willingness to 
bargain, a commitment to reaching a decision through compromise, and, when appropriate, 
the use of a neutral mediator. [d. at 18-19. 
42. David Passmore makes a useful distinction between ecological problems, that are 
primarily social and political, and problems in ecology that are mostly scientific, see D. 
PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE (1974). Ashby points out that while it is for the 
scientists to say whether there is a hazard to the environment and what its causes are, it is for 
administrators and politicians to decide what to do about the alleged hazard, see E. ASHBY, 
RECONCILING MAN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT 30-31 (1978). The scientific question-the problem 
in ecology-has to be answered first, Hard facts have to be separated from the distorted 
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A. Irreversible Effects 
In labor-management disputes, a disastrous strike-or settlement 
-may drive a company into bankruptcy, induce it to leave the state 
or country, or have a devastating impact on the financial and per-
sonallives of workers: all changes that apparently are irreversible. 
But bankrupt firms can be reorganized or sold while production con-
tinues. Massachusetts may lose jobs, but Georgia gains them. 
Workers can be retrained for new jobs. Most critically, however, 
nearly all of these changes could be reversed. If society had a desire 
to revive the New England textile industry it would only be a matter 
of assembling the necessary resources. 
An environmental dispute, on the other hand, may involve truly ir-
reversible effects such as habitat destruction or species extinction. 
E.P. Odum writes: 
Until recently, mankind has more or less taken for granted the 
gas-exchange, water-purification, nutrient-cycling, and other 
reporting of the hazard. Again, as Ashby points out, this sounds simple enough. However, it is 
not so simple to separate fact-statements from value-statements. 
(1) The scientist does not deal with "the whole crystal of reality," he deals with only one 
facet at a time. Problems in ecology are complex; the only way to tackle them is to simplify 
them, and the only way to simplify them is to cut out less relevant information. When the 
scientist gives an opinion, it is important to ask what simplifications he has made. 
(2) The responsible authority may not appreciate reservations in a scientist's report. The 
"might's," "possibly's," and "probably's" are typically brushed aside. The temptation is for 
the journalist who reports the story and for the politician who has to interpret public opinion to 
strip away all the conditions surrounding the report of the evidence. 
(3) An indisputable fact (such as this sample of air contains so much ozone) is value-free, but 
as soon as a scientist claims that there is a 20 percent chance of a particular amount of ozone 
being present, he is expressing, numerically, a degree of belief, i.e., making a value judgment. 
When he makes predictions from probabilities (and that is what scientific advice often entails), 
he is assuming that the thing he has measured will continue to behave as consistently in the 
future as it has in the past. While this assumption is well-founded in simple physical situations, 
it is unlikely to be true in complex ecological situations. (On the complexity of ecological prob-
lems, see H. SPROUT & M. SPROUT, supra, note 1, 56-65). 
(4) Another difficulty in separating fact-statements from value-statements is that the scien-
tist may not have asked the right question. In the 1960's, scientists were asked, "Do 
phosphates in detergents endanger lakes and if so, what can replace phosphates that will not 
harm lakes?" The answer was yes, excess phosphate does harm some lakes, and yes, a 
substance called NTA could replace phosphates in detergents and not harm lakes. It was only 
later that the scientists added to their reply a piece of information for which they had not been 
asked, namely that under certain circumstances NTA in drinking water might cause cancer. 
So, the scientist often has to reinterpret the question about which he has been asked to give ad-
vice in light of the social or political purposes behind it. This clearly draws value considerations 
into play. 
In summary, there are problems in ecology about which the policy makers and the public 
want factual information, but these statements of fact, to the extent that they can be value-
free (which is only partially), do not answer the question of what ought to be done. And, it is 
the "ought" that lies at the heart of most environmental disputes. [d. at 40-53. 
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protective functions of self-maintaining ecosystems, chiefly 
because neither his numbers nor his environmental manipula-
tions have been great enough to affect regional and global 
balances. Now, of course, it is painfully evident that such 
balances are being affected, often detrimentally.4s 
Certain important features of ecological systems are now well-
documented. First, limits are ubiquitous.44 Not only are there limits 
to resources, there are limits to the rate at which the environment 
can receive wastes and return them in usable form, and to its capaci-
ty for storing them in innocuous form. Second, ecosystems are made 
up of interdependent components, and ecosystems are open and 
linked to each other.46 As a result, events at one place in the environ-
ment are bound to have repercussions in other places at other times. 
Because of the interconnectedness and complexity of the environ-
ment, some consequences are bound to be unpredictable. 
Third, actions which are massive enough, drastic enough, or sim-
ply of the right sort will cause environmental changes which are ir-
reversible.46 Species extinction is one form of irreversible change. 
Another is ecological "simplification." When human interference 
with the natural environment becomes too extensive, it can produce 
an environment no longer sujtable for complex ecosystem interac-
tionY Such "simplified" environments tend to be highly unstable, 
and additional interventions (for example, pest control on land 
recently cleared for farming) tend to be inherently destabilizing. The 
result is environmental change that cannot be reversed. 48 
The question of the reversibility of man's impact on the environ-
ment is confused by the notion that we can "fix up" troublesome 
situations. For example, if a method could be devised for profitably 
using the sulphur in coal, the assumption is that the electric power 
companies would extract it from their fuel or from their stack gases, 
and air pollution by sulphur oxides would disappear. Usually, though, 
technological solutions do not merely remove the problems at which 
43. Odum, The Strategy of Ecosystem Development, 164 SCIENCE 262 (1969). 
44. See ENVIRONMENT: RESOURCES, POLLUTION, AND SOCIETY 26 (W. Murdock ed. 1972). 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. For example, the author notes: "Typically, when tropical forests are removed and 
the soil exposed (this process is occurring today in Brazil's Amazon region, see Governments 
Move to Stem Amazon Destruction, N.Y. Times, November 20, 1979 at C3), the mineral 
nutrients (already poor) are leached by the rain. The soil usually becomes hardened and 
thereafter the forest will not grow back again, nor can crops be grown. Such irreversible 
changes will almost always produce a simplification of the environment." 
48. [d. 
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they are aimed. Indeed, most of our environmental deterioration is 
the direct or indirect result of advances in technology. "In effect, we 
are using technology to climb out of technological traps of our own 
devising. But the new technology may, in fact, create new 
technological traps from which we will be able to extricate ourselves 
only with further technology, and so on, indefinitely."49 
While there are remedial actions we can take to reverse some 
adverse environmental impacts (such as the addition of certain 
micro-nutrients to "reverse" the eutrophication of a lake), efforts to 
fix one problem tend to create new ecological difficulties. This is not 
an argument against all development or industrial expansion; rather, 
our intention is merely to underscore the fact that the irreversibility 
of certain environmental impacts is an important agenda item in 
most environmental disputes and a concern that sets environmental 
disputes apart from other social conflicts. 
All irreversible effects are not, in and of themselves, harmful, but 
the destabilizing impact of most of man's interventions and the 
resulting ecological simplification must be taken into account in any 
decision likely to have a substantial impact on the natural environ-
ment. This is especially difficult because we have few tools or tech-
niques for predicting long-term catastrophic impacts, let alone for 
working them into cost-benefit calculations. 
B. The Indeterminate Nature, Boundaries, and Costs 
of Environmental Disputes 
In a labor dispute, what is at issue is reasonably clear. Contract 
terms such as wages, fringe benefits, and work conditions provide a 
common vocabulary for the parties. Further, the parties are usually 
comfortable comparing competing offers in dollar terms. 50 The 
"boundaries" of the labor dispute are also clear or can be readily 
estimated. Thus, the disputants are known,51 it is clear that the set-
49. AMERICA"S CHANGING ENVIRONMENT at xxxi (R. Revelle & H. Lansberg eds. 1970). An il-
lustration of the dilemma may be seen today in the very example we have given. Electric 
power companies are presently removing much of the sulfur from coal (via "scrubbers") in 
order to comply with federal ambient air quality standards. But this "solution" to an air pollu-
tion problem has created a new solid waste problem-how to dispose of the toxic sludge pro-
duced by the "scrubbers" in an environmentally sound manner. 
50. When serious disagreements about the issues do arise, it is often because they involve 
problems that are not readily translated into dollars: for example, the role of the worker in 
controlling his work schedule or the introduction of innovative production processes designed 
to make work in the factory less tedious and dehumanizing. 
51. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), provides a system for 
determining the size ("boundary") of the union bargaining unit in a labor dispute. Section 9(b) 
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tlement will include only those parties, and there is little question as 
to the impact of the settlement. 52 
Costs are also fairly "symmetrical" in labor disputes. A strike 
prevents the employer from making a profit and the employee from 
earning a wage, and it is not always the employer who can absorb the 
costs of conflict more readily. When a strike occurs at the start of a 
retail merchant's "busy season," or when a manufacturer has a 
depleted inventory, it may be the employer, not the workers, who is 
damaged more by the action. The important things to note are: (1) 
each side has the ability to inflict costs on the other, but by doing so, 
must also absorb some-perhaps even greater-costs, and (2) there 
may be costs to a bad agreement as well as a strike. If an exorbitant 
wage agreement prices a company's products out of the market, 
both sides suffer. In an extreme case, of course, the company fails 
and both workers and the employer absorb tremendous costs as the 
result of a "bad" settlement or a prolonged strike. 
Environmental disputes, in contrast, are often marked by an in-
ability to make precise-or even general-determinations about 
costs, parties, and boundaries. The symmetry seen in the assignment 
of costs in labor disputes is also almost wholly missing from en-
vironmental disputes. For the relatively minor cost of litigation, an 
environmental group can inflict millions of dollars in added interest 
charges and other costs of delay on a developer. On the other hand, 
the victorious developer will proceed with his project, inflicting real 
(if impossible to quantify in dollars) costs on the environmentalists 
who see the things they value-cleaner air and water, a more 
"natural" use of land, less radioactive waste, etc.-endangered. 
Thus, instead of symmetrical costs, as is the case with labor 
disputes, the costs of environmental disputes are skewed in two 
ways. First, environmentalists can initiate a conflict, at relatively 
minor cost to themselves, that may impose large costs on a 
developer, industry, or community. Second, because developers do 
not attach the same value to the costs of environmental "change" 
of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976» permits the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to 
"decide in each case" whether the "appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining shall 
be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." Thus, for example, the 
NLRB could decide whether the appropriate bargaining unit for a union in the automobile in-
dustry was: (1) all the workers at Ford; (2) all machinists throughout the industry; (3) the 
workers at a single plant; (4) the workers in a section of a plant; or, (5) some other appropriate 
subdivision. See R. GoRMAN. LABOR LAW 66-92 (1976). 
52. The major area of uncertainty, typically, is the effect of the contract on future employ-
ment; i.e., will the settlement be so costly as to curb the company's growth or create incentives 
towards relocation, increased automation, etc.? 
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that environmentalists do, it is the environmentalists who bear most 
of the costs-in environmental degradation-caused by a defeat or a 
"bad" settlement (i.e., one that provides insufficient protection). 
Working together, these asymmetries tend to make environmental 
conflict more prevalent and more intense because conflict costs 
relatively little to initiate and the costs of defeat are borne almost en-
tirely by the losing party. 
There are also several general difficulties that arise in attempting 
to calculate costs in environmental disputes. These are the problems 
of setting geographic boundaries and an appropriate time horizon for 
the analysis of costs and benefits; the problem of translating en-
vironmental impacts into a common unit of analysis (such as dollars); 
and the problem of summing the various judgments of different in-
dividuals and groups, each of which has a different "objective func-
tion. "53 
The implications of an agreement to compensate environmen-
talists for the adverse impacts of a proposed project are not easily 
determined. By changing the geographic boundaries of an en-
vironmental dispute, additional stakeholders are either drawn-in or 
excluded and by definition, the costs of compensation are changed. 
Similarly, second and third order impacts are either counted in as a 
part of the impact for which fair compensation has to be negotiated, 
or counted out. There are no correct geographic boundaries for a 
particular environmental dispute. This is a matter that must, itself, 
be negotiated. 
The problem of setting an appropriate time horizon is equally 
troublesome. Some environmental impacts do not appear for 
decades. Is the developer responsible for compensating parties that 
are not affected until decades later?54 Also, it is difficult to attach a 
discounted value to adverse impacts that build up or continue for 
generations. 55 
In calculating fair compensation for adverse environmental im-
53. See E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 130-33 (1978). 
54. The conflict over a proposed co-generation facility in Boston, the Medical Area Total 
Energy Plant (MATEP), illustrates another aspect of the time horizon problem. The proposed 
design called for the use of diesel engines. A dispute arose about the proper time period for 
measuring the nitrogen oxides in the diesel exhaust. Opponents of MATEP were concerned 
about possible harmful concentrations of only an hour's duration, while the developer was 
seeking an emission standard based on average concentration during a 24 hour period. See 
FREIDMAN, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE ENERGY FACILITY SITING PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF 
THE MEDICAL AREA TOTAL ENERGY PLAN (MATEP) (Energy Impacts Project Technical Report 
No. 17, Laboratory of Architecture and Planning, M.I.T., 1979). 
55. See STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 53, at 159-176. 
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pacts it is important to consider the benefits of environmental protec-
tion, and to subtract these from the costs, in developing an overall 
accounting. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on how to value en-
vironmental benefits. What is the value of clean air, untouched 
wilderness, or scenic beauty? We can measure pollution costs (at 
least indirectly) by estimating the additional days that workers are 
productive when their health is not impaired by air pollution. We can 
measure the cost of eliminating a wilderness area in terms of days of 
recreation lost (translated, in part, into fees and employment bene-
fits). And we can measure the loss of property value in areas where 
standards for environmental protection are not maintained. The in-
trinsic benefits of clean air, wilderness preservation, or scenic beau-
ty, however, are very hard to calculate, especially if we attempt to 
take into account the benefits to future generations. 
Neither environmental costs nor benefits translates easily into a 
common unit of analysis. Much has been written about the inade-
quacy of dollars as a unit of environmental value. 56 Traditional 
economic analyses have had difficulty evaluating the replacement 
resources, and consequently, there is no basis for calculating the 
economic value of the resources. Attempts have been made to use 
"units of energy" to bridge economic and environmental values, 57 
but these are still in the exploratory stage. 
The problems of summing the various judgments or cost-benefit 
calculations of different individuals and groups are also well docu-
mented. 58 In theory, the amalgamation is not possible. The best we 
can hope for is a set of different cost-benefit calculations represent-
ing the different vantage points of each interested party. These 
groups can (and in fact do) use their own cost-benefit calculations as 
the basis for the positions they take in negotiations. There is no 
known way, however, for a single analyst or public agency to add all 
56. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 28. As an illustration of the problem, consider an en-
vironmental dispute in which the parties agreed that a proposed power plant would emit "x" 
tons of stack gases per day. In the ensuing debate over whether "x" tons is an acceptable level, 
it might be shown that one of the costs of "x" tons of emissions per day is a probable increase· 
in human morbidity or mortality. For many environmentalists, translating such costs into 
dollar terms would be morally and philosophically repugnant. Further, any such translation 
would most likely involve proxies for morbidity and mortality-e.g., lost wages and produc-
tivity-that would be perceived as inadequate in measuring non-economic loss. 
57. See LAVINE. BUTLER. & MEYBURG, ENERGY ANALYSIS FOR BRIDGING ECONOMIC AND EN-
VIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 28 (E.I.A. Review No.2, Oct. 1978). 
58. See VOLKER & HOBBS, ANALYTICAL MULTIOBJECTIVE DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUES AND 
POWER PLANT SITING: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE (Nat'l Technical Information Services (NTIS) 
No. ORNL-5288, 1978). 
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the costs of environmental impacts experienced by all the groups af-
fected and determine the correct amount of compensation to be paid. 
Each group will value a particular impact differently, depending on 
its distaooe from the source of the impact and its socio-economic 
status. Wealthy families will pay a very substantial amount to block 
even a small intrusion into a recreational or second-home communi-
ty. Such adverse impacts mean a lot to them and they have the ability 
to pay a substantial amount to stop them, probably much more than 
lower-income families could or would be willing to pay to stop similar 
intrusions. 
In a much publicized and bitterly attacked article, Environmen-
talism and the Leisure Class, William Tucker suggests that, 
to say that one is an environmentalist. . . is to say that one has 
achieved enough well-being from the private system and that 
one is now content to let it remain as it is-or even retrogress a 
little-because one's material comfort under the present system 
has been more or less assured. 59 
This view coincides with the often repeated assertion that the en-
vironmental movement is something that only wealthy people can af-
ford to support. If this assertion is correct, it will make environmen-
tal mediation much more difficult. Compensation for costs is not 
much of an incentive to a group for which fair compensation is irrele-
vant. The data available, however, on the socio-economic make-up of 
the "environmental movement" in the United States do not support 
Tucker's allegation. 
The results of the first comprehensive survey of environmental 
values, conducted in 1977 by Resources for the Future, offers 
evidence that contradicts Tucker's view. As the table below in-
dicates, more than half of the citizens of the United States support 
environmental protection "at any cost." While the older segments of 
the population were not nearly so enthusiastic about the need for ag-
gressive environmental protection programs, other factors such as 
race, educational level, or family income do not separate the en-
vironmental supporters from the non-believers. Active supporters of 
the environmental movement are almost as likely to come from the 
under $6,000 income bracket as they are from the over $30,000 in-
come bracket, although the wealthiest segments of our society are 
more likely to be members of local or national environmental groups. 
The Resources for the Future study suggests that environmental ad-
vocates do not just include the wealthiest citizens. 
59. Tucker, Environmentalism and the Leisure Class, HARPER'S, December, 1977 at 49. 
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One further difficulty complicates the task of calculating costs in 
environmental disputes: the problem of determining what each party 
to an environmental dispute is, in fact, willing to accept in the way of 
a side payment or promise of equivalent environmental value. At the 
outset of a dispute, some of the least powerful parties are likely to 
exaggerate their claims in an effort to be heard. Until such time as 
real offers are proffered and individuals or groups must actually 
decide whether or not to accept, the espoused preferences or expres-
sions of what fair compensation (costs) would have to include are 
somewhat suspect. The inevitable gap between "espoused" and "re-
vealed" preferences is well documented.60 What the disputants need 
59.5 The Public Speaks Again: A New Environmental Survey, RESOURCES Fig. 5, at 4 (No. 
60 Sept.-Nov. 1978) (Newsletter of Resources for the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C.). 
60. See J. DEVANEY, G. ASHE & B. PARKHURST, PARABLE BEACH: A PRIMER IN COASTAL ZONE 
ECONOMICS (1976); STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 53. 
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to know is not what the other parties say they would accept as fair 
compensation, but rather the amount they would, in fact, accept. 
There have been some breakthroughs in dealing with the problems 
described above. The Energy Impacts Project at MIT, for example, 
has proposed a way to deal with these problems.61 The most promis-
ing strategies involve the use of an "auction" for determining fair 
compensation for adverse social and environmental impacts. Each 
neighborhood or community could submit a "bid" indicating the side 
payments, compensatory measures, and trades of equivalent en-
vironmental value it would have to receive in order to be neutral to 
or favorably disposed toward a proposed project. The bid would 
carry with it a community-wide commitment to facilitate develop-
ment, assuming the costs are compensated and the developer con-
forms to the guidelines and impact levels advertised at the outset of 
the bidding process. If we assume that fair compensation or side 
payments of some sort are crucial incentives to bargaining, then the 
problems outlined above must be addressed in any environmental 
dispute resolution effort. They are significant, but not insurmount-
able, obstacles that tend to make environmental dispute resolution 
that much more difficult. 
c. Serving the "Public Interest"-Questions 
of Representation and Legitimacy 
Another unique aspect of environmental disputes is that advocates 
of one position or another claim that they represent not just their 
own concerns but the "public interest" as well.62 By identifying with 
the public interest, each group hopes to fend off political attacks and 
to win popular support. Unfortunately, this tends to confuse and 
complicate, rather than illuminate debate.63 While environmentalists 
61. See O'Hare, Not On My Block You Don't!: Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance 
of Compensation, 25 PUB. POL. 407 (1977). 
62. Despite the long and serious debate in the social policy disciplines, most scholars would 
probably agree with the recent observation that: "It may be impossible to determine whether 
the public interest has been satisfactorily defined, let alone when it has been achieved," see 
DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process: Empirical Find-
ings, Remaining Issues and a Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409, 441. For 
most public policy analysts, the search for a unitary public interest has long been regarded as 
futile. Particular decisions may be viewed as optimal because they benefit almost everyone and 
hurt no one, but there are no guarantees that the outcome of such a decision will be judged to 
be in the public interest. There are too many dimensions along which different segments of the 
population must evaluate an outcome, with each segment likely to have different time 
horizons, risk orientations and values. 
63. The following statement illustrates the problem: "[TJhe courts need to recognize that 
whereas governmental agencies are the representatives of the 'economic' interests, the con-
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may feel that they represent the public interest because environmen-
tal protection is in "everyone's best interest," policy makers facing 
difficult environment-development trade-offs must balance a great 
many factors. Once a question is cast in terms of support for the 
public interest, rather than in terms of balancing or accommodating 
the interests of various publics, compromise becomes difficult. 64 
Professor Stewart has noted another set of problems regarding 
the legitimacy of "public interest" advocates. Stewart questions 
"whether a public interest advocate truly represents the interest for 
which he purports to speak and, ultimately, how that interest is to be 
defined,"65 noting that the advocate is often a lawyer who is "not 
subject to any mechanism of accountability to ensure his loyalty to 
the scattered individuals whose interests he purports to repre-
sent."66 Stewart fears that, particularly in the context of settle-
ments,67 "the lawyer will not advocate the interests ofthe broad con-
stituency supposedly represented, but rather his own interests or 
those of a few active members of that constituency."68 Further, in 
Stewart's view, these problems are only partially alleviated where it 
is an organization, rather than scattered individuals, whom the 
lawyer represents. He notes that, although the lawyer will presum-
ably be responsive to the organization's leadership and the leader-
ship is presumed to be responsive to the membership, "often such 
organizations purport to represent, and are perceived as represent-
ing, a far broader class of individuals than their own members."69 
The "public interest" problem thus has two aspects. First, when 
one side sees itself as the only legitimate representative of the 
"public interest," accommodation becomes difficult. Second, there 
servation groups are more apt to represent the 'public interest' "; see Tremaine, Standing in 
the Federal Courts for Conservation Groups, 6 URB. LAW. 116, 136-37 (1972). 
64. This problem has been addressed by a group organized by the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences. They note "with regard to environmental disputes, value conflicts may 
have been submerged in the past because of a nearly universal agreement that economic 
growth and efficiency were desirable ends in themselves, or at least they were important in 
whatever system of ends might be pursued. In today's much more fluid situation, competing 
values, recognized by many as equally valid, are receiving widespread support. The result is an 
inherent tension and moral ambiguity about values-a classic instance of Hegel's conflict of 
"right against right." See Tribe, et ai., supra note 28, at xi-xii; see also Marcus, supra note 3, 
at 582 n.i. 
65. Stewart, supra note 21, at 1764; see generally, id. at 1762-70. 
66. Id. at 1765. 
67. Id. Stewart notes that: "Whenever representation is undertaken on behalf of an 
unorganized class, there is a danger that settlements will be reached simply to get the lawyer a 
fee." Id. at 1743 n.354. 
68. Id. at 1765-66; id. at 1766 n.460. 
69. Id. at 1767. 
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are real questions as to whether "public interest" advocates can 
legitimately be said to represent the public (or even their own 
constituency!). 
To the extent that the parties to an environmental dispute are able 
to recognize their dispute as one of "right against right," dispute 
resolution is possible. Where one side or another, however, sees 
itself as the only legitimate representive of the "public interest"-
and the dispute is thus perceived as right against wrong-the outlook 
for accommodation is bleak. 70 
There is not only confusion over what is and what is not in the 
public interest, there is also disagreement over what the public itself 
encompasses. Justice Douglas (and Professor Stone) have argued 
that contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological 
equilibrium should lead us to confer "standing" upon environmental 
objects so that they can sue for their own preservation. It appears 
that this view should have us include inanimate objects as part of the 
public. Quoting Justice Douglas, " 'public interest' has so many dif-
fering shades of meaning as to be quite meaningless on the environ-
mental front."71 
D. Implementation 
Implementation of collective bargaining agreements is rarely a 
problem. There are numerous reasons for this: first, the parties have 
entered a well-understood contractual relationship whose terms are 
clear both to the parties and to the court or administrative agency-
usually the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-which may be 
called on to interpret it; second, collective bargaining is repeated in 
regular cycles, making it difficult for either party to flout an agree-
ment since that will only make the next round of bargaining more 
onerous and, therefore, likely to be much more costly to both sides; 
third, and most important, both labor and management are aware 
that if implementation does not occur, the result, a renewed strike or 
other "work action," will be costly for both. 72 
With environmental disputes, implementation is much trickier. 
Agreements in environmental disputes are novel: courts and agen-
cies are unfamiliar with their terms and may interpret them in ways 
unforeseen by the parties in the event of a question in their im-
plementation. Furthermore, because the parties to environmental 
70. See Friedman, supra note 17. 
71. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745 (1972); see Stone, supra note 28. 
72. See text at notes 50·53 supra. 
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disputes are less readily identifiable than the representatives of labor 
and management, there is always the possibility that an agreement 
will be challenged-and its implementation frustrated-by an in-
dividual or group not included in the process. Also, because en-
vironmental groups are less cohesive than labor unions, a group that 
was involved in a settlement effort may fragment over a proposed 
agreement, with the newly-created "splinter group" attempting to 
halt implementation of the parent group's bargain. 
In collective bargaining, moreover, once the principal parties have 
agreed to the terms of a settlement there is ordinarily no question 
that the parties will have the ability to implement it. In rare cases an 
agreement may be frustrated by government-for example, because 
it violates wage guidelines or labor laws-or, more frequently, re-
jected by the union rank and file. However, in the vast majority of 
labor disputes the settlements achieved through collective bargain-
ing (whether by negotiation or mediation) are implemented in due 
course. 
In environmental disputes, on the other hand, whenever the sub-
ject matter of a settlement is within the statutory jurisdiction of a 
government agency, the parties to that settlement will require agen-
cy approval to implement their agreement. For example, even if local 
residents, environmentalists, and businessmen have negotiated the 
settlement of a siting dispute involving a new industrial plant, 
various government agencies may have jurisdiction over the location 
of the plant (local zoning boards and planning agencies); its mode of 
operation (a state air quality control board); or disposal of industrial 
by-products (the Environmental Protection Agency through its 
regulation of hazardous wastes). If these agencies have not been par-
ties to the bargaining process and settlement, they may find that 
they cannot both honor the voluntary settlement and fulfill their 
statutory mandate. In such cases, public agencies, by denying or 
qualifying the necessary permits and licenses, or initiating enforce-
ment actions, may frustrate implementation of informal agreements. 
IV. "NINE STEPS" TO RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
As should be clear from the discussion above of the special 
characteristics of environmental disputes, the labor-management 
analogy is likely to be insufficient. A conflict resolution strategy 
must be especially tailored to the unique demands of environmental 
disputes. 
We believe that environmental dispute resolution shares some of 
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the characteristics of the public participation efforts that urban plan-
ners have tried for many years to implement. Planners have always 
assumed that the citizen participation requirements contained in 
various federal, state, and local laws were meant to bring all the 
stakeholders into a decision-making role. While many, if not most, 
participatory efforts have been little more than window-dressing, 73 
those that have been judged successful have brought all the parties 
together to consider alternatives and collaborate in the design of a 
best way of proceeding.74 While participatory efforts have often 
failed to produce consensus, they have, on occasion, yielded 
negotiated settlements which the parties have volunteered to sup-
port. To the extent the analogy holds, the design of an effective 
bargaining process ought to build in part on what the planning pro-
fession has learned. 75 The nine steps toward ad hoc dispute resolu-
tion described below are built, in part, on the attempts thus far to 
resolve environmental disputes76 and on past efforts to engage com-
peting publics in the city planning process. They also incorporate our 
understanding of the unique problems encountered in environmental 
conflicts. 
A. Step #1: Identifying the Parties That Have a Stake 
in the Outcome of a Dispute 
Naming the interests that have a stake in a particular dispute is 
not only a procedural problem that must be solved in order for 
bargaining to proceed, it is also a substantive problem in some 
disputes. Conflict may arise, for instance, because one group feels it 
should be involved but a second group insists that the first group be 
excluded. The first step toward resolving such disagreements is to 
identify the parties that want to participate in a bargaining effort. (It 
is better to include too many people or groups than too few.) 
One argument often made against wide-scale participation in 
bargaining or conflict resolution is that the task of sustaining effec-
tive dialogue is too difficult. Yet, the scale of negotiation in any par-
ticular dispute is not nearly as much of a problem as it might seem. 
The key is to shift the focus from the number of parties involved to 
the categories of interests that want and ought to participate. For 
73. See Arnstein, A Ladder ojC;f;zen Participation, J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 216-224 (July, 
1969). 
74. See M. F AGENCE. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING (1977). 
75. See S. LANGTON, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (1978). 
76. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION, supra note 11; O'Connor, supra note 11. 
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example, an environmental standard-setting controversy might in-
volve localized interests who view a proposed change in government 
regulations as undesirable. Several regulatory bodies, and perhaps 
other elected and appointed officials, would also have an interest in 
whether or not such regulations are adopted. Every person in each 
category (local interests, government agencies, special interest 
groups) need not participate in the negotiations. The most important 
task is identifying the range of interests that have something at 
stake. 
B. Step #2: Ensuring That Groups or Interests That Have 
A Stake in the Outcome are Appropriately Represented 
If the way to solve the scale problem is to move to a system of 
interest-group representation, then it is equally essential to develop 
an effective means of determining whether the spokesmen who claim 
to represent various interests are indeed able to do so. There are 
three strategies for identifying legitimate interest group represent-
atives. The first involves reliance on networks of existing organiza-
tions. The second involves ad hoc elections. The third depends on the 
capacity of administrators, regulators, or the mediator to select 
representatives who have credibility with the larger groups involved. 
None of these techniques is foolproof, but individually or in combina-
tion they can work effectively if the choice of a method for ensuring 
legitimate representation is, itself, open to scrutiny and involves the 
participation of, at least, surrogate group representatives. 
The bargaining agents or interest group representatives need to 
validate the support of their organizations at regular intervals. 
Elected or approved representatives are not likely to maintain their 
credibility unless they check periodically with the stakeholders they 
represent. It may also be necessary, in some situations, for groups to 
have more than one representative. Different delegates might be 
assigned to represent a group's interests during various rounds of 
bargaining-especially if questions requiring technical expertise 
emerge. Usually, a problem-specific and revolving membership is 
preferable to figurehead leaders or representatives who are not 
especially knowledgeable about or interested in the items being 
debated. 
In some cases, it may be difficult to identify legitimate par-
ticipants. Disputes may arise over who should participate or who 
should represent an identifiable group of participants. Such 
disagreements are, themselves, often susceptible to bargaining. Too 
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often, such opportunities are missed. Early controversies over par-
ticipation or representation are often brushed aside only to arise 
later, frustrating ratification once a solution is reached. 
There are not only disagreements over who should be admitted to 
the bargaining process-equally difficult problems emerge when 
those who ought to be involved decide, for one reason or another, to 
remain aloof, only to sabotage an emerging consensus at a later 
time. Very often it is the most powerful participants who prefer to 
go it alone; yet these are the very participants vital to the success of 
the bargaining process. Those involved in a dispute resolution effort, 
including neutral intervenors, may find it necessary to persuade 
recalcitrant, but legitimate, participants to take part. 
Even after all the appropriate participants have been identified, 
disputes may arise within interest group coalitions, challenging the 
integrity of team representatives. Mediation techniques can be used 
to avoid or settle disputes among factions. 77 
It is important to be precise about the meaning of participation: 
not all participants can or should participate in a dispute resolution 
process to the same degree or over the same period of time. Those 
most directly concerned, for whatever reason, will want and should 
be permitted to participate from the start, in greater depth, and with 
greater frequency than those with less direct concerns. As the proc-
ess continues, the parties will change. Groups whose concerns have 
been satisfied or who discover they have no real interest in the out-
come will depart; other groups will become involved as their in-
terests become clearer. It is crucial that everyone involved share 
responsibility for helping newcomers become part of the bargaining 
process. 
C. Step #3: Narrowing the Agenda and Confronting 
Fundamentally Different Values and Assumptions 
There are times when contending parties have only a vague idea 
about why they are for or against a project. Often they can express 
their preference in only the most generalized terms. For example, it 
is easy to find vocal proponents and opponents of off-shore oil ex-
ploration, but both groups would, if asked, have difficulty pinpoint-
ing the issues on which they disagree. Proponents and opponents of 
dam-building are easy to find, but the precise issues at stake are 
77. For a discussion of such techniques, see W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING (1971). 
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often hard to specify. Involved are such considerations as the protec-
tion of endangered species, the use of water by nearby as well as dis-
tant consumers, power generation, farming, sport fishing, and real 
estate development. When confronted with such cases, stakeholders 
must consider various strategies for narrowing the issues. The agen-
da will change as the decision cycle evolves; additional issues may 
emerge as new groups enter the process. 
Some disputes appear to center on rather small differences in the 
preferences expressed by participating groups or individuals. Some-
times these mask more fundamental disagreements. It is essential 
that the parties understand the extent to which fundamentally dif-
ferent assumptions and values are in conflict. 
For example, if one group assumes that air pollution causes 
aesthetic and minor health problems but another group assumes that 
air pollution kills people, it would not be surprising if they disagreed 
on the appropriate action to take regarding the need to close a 
polluting factory. While they might debate the relative effectiveness 
of penalties that could be imposed on the owners of the factory or the 
probable impact of various regulations, they would, in fact, be 
debating fundamentally different views about the problem of air 
pollution. While two or more groups might share the same assump-
tions about the air pollution problem, they could differ on the best 
way of solving the problem. Their models of man-environmei.~t in-
teraction or their assumptions about the efficacy of various forms of 
government intervention might conflict. 
The need to confront fundamentally different assumptions and 
values is clear-if only to help understand the issues at the heart of a 
dispute. From a tactical or strategic standpoint, the process of con-
frontation can lead to changes in positions or at least to a clarifica-
tion of the issues at stake. 
The fact that contending groups hold different assumptions or do 
not share common values does not mean that they are fated to 
disagree forever. In some instances, assumptions are based on faulty 
or insufficiently understood data.7s At times, adversaries start with 
an emotional bias and select only data that reinforce their biases. 
Challenges to such selective perceptions can be effective if handled 
properly. People do change positions on issues; it is essential to pin-
point the information and information sources that the participants 
admit would effectively challenge their views. 
78. See STRAUS & GREENBERG. DATA MEDIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES (1977); Up 
Front Resolution of Environmental and Economic Disputes, ENVIRONMENTAL COMMENT (May, 
1978). 
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D. Step #4: Generating a Sufficient Number of 
Alternatives or Options 
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Bringing all the parties to the bargaining table is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for reaching a settlement. Even with ade-
quate representation and a clarification of deeply-rooted value dif-
ferences, in order to move toward a no-lose trade-off or consensus 
solution, it is necessary to generate a sufficient number of policy, 
project, or program alternatives. Every group must be able to find 
an option that it favors. This often means that a do-nothing or no-
build option must be included. The most important measure of the 
sufficiency of the options generated is the ability of all the parties to 
a dispute to find one that they favor. This helps to ensure that all the 
points of contention can surface and that every group feels that 
there is a reason to proceed with the bargaining. 
It may not be possible to know all the appropriate alternatives 
early in the bargaining process. This means that an effective 
bargaining situation is one in which new options or alternatives can 
be added along the way. 
E. Step #5: Agreeing on the Boundaries and Time 
Horizon for Analysis 
No matter what a dispute centers on, the need to specify the 
boundaries and to designate a time horizon for analysis is overriding. 
By broadening the boundaries used to assess the impacts of a pro-
posed action or policy, it is possible to tip the overall balance of costs 
and benefits implied by a project. By shifting the time horizon, it is 
possible to cut off the boundaries for analysis either before or after a 
dramatic impact occurs. 
It is often argued by environmental scientists that the boundaries 
for analysis, including the specification of a time horizon, are implied 
by the problem at hand. A dispute over air pollution standards ought 
to be handled by everyone in the airshed. Likewise, a water pollution 
control controversy ought to involve everyone in the watershed. But 
these assumptions rarely provide useful guidelines. Invariably, the 
spillover effects of efforts to control or resolve a problem exceed the 
natural ecological boundaries of the site or system in question. Add-
ing to the boundaries problem is the fact that the public agencies in-
volved in analyzing impacts or administering remedies typically have 
a legal or political jurisdiction that is narrower than the scope of the 
environmental disputes they face. 
The boundaries of a problem and the designation of a time horizon 
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for analysis ought to be viewed as negotiable items in any environ-
mental dispute. Again, these can be treated as procedural issues. It 
is difficult to make bargaining work without resolving these issues, 
at least tentatively, to the satisfaction of all the parties involved. 
They can also be viewed as substantive issues-differences in percep-
tions about appropriate boundaries and time horizon may be at the 
heart of a dispute. 
F. Step #6: Weighting, Scaling, and Amalgamating 
Judgments about Costs and Benefits 
There may be impacts of special concern to each of the contending 
parties. While part of every bargaining process must focus on the list 
of impacts to be discussed, the entire group must ultimately accept 
the financial and time limits on the analyses available to them and 
reach accord on the best way of investing in research and data-
gathering. How the contending parties relate to each other and 
judge the advantages and disadvantages of the options available 
depends, in large part, on the attitudes of the parties toward the ap-
propriateness of the forecasts that are made. Appropriateness, in 
this instance, refers to the scales chosen for calibrating each type of 
impact, the weight attached to each of the many impacts that the 
groups have insisted on including in the analysis, and procedures 
used to amalgamate summary judgments. 
The resolution of environmental disputes is frequently frustrated 
by disagreements over the facts used by opposing parties in describ-
ing base-line conditions as well as the probable impacts of proposed 
changes. 
There are many ways in which parties can differ over facts. There 
can be simple differences over such easily verified questions as the 
precise boundary line between properties or the demographic com-
position of an area. Differences may occur over questions for which 
there are no precise answers (such as the probability of hurricanes or 
earthquakes), but for which there are available scientific predictions 
based on generally accepted methods. Factual disputes arise when 
different methods of collecting data are used; for example, when 
there are a number of different measures that can be used to deter-
mine the extent of a floodplain or the quality of air or water. There 
are also data questions that cannot be resolved given the current 
state of scientific knowledge: for example, the effect on humans and 
animals of high-tension electrical wires, or the effect of supersonic 
aircraft on the atmosphere. 
Even if facts and accurate measures can be acquired, the way they 
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are used and the weight that is given to them in making predictions, 
or constructing models, can be disputed. For example, various pre-
dictions have been made regarding the effect of the proposed six-
lane Westside Highway in New York City. Proponents of the 
highway predict that its effect will be to siphon traffic off the streets 
of New York, thus relieving vehicular congestion on the adjoining 
streets and reducing air pollution. Opponents of the highway predict 
that it will increase traffic coming into New York, thus increasing 
congestion on the neighboring streets and increasing air pollution. 
These predictions vary because the contending groups make dif-
ferent assumptions about the volume of peak hour and off-peak traf-
fic. Many other examples of competing use of the same data are com-
mon and sometimes give rise to the "battle-of-the-printout." 
Complete agreement on the facts in any given situation is, of 
course, impossible. On the other hand, experience to date suggests 
that many environmental disputes contain a higher quotient of 
disputed facts than would exist if data mediation were employed.79 
Data mediation can take many forms. One approach is to press the 
contending parties to share the information they intend to use to 
support their arguments. As data are gathered, all parties are asked 
to comment, or at least to note potential objections regarding the 
validity of sources, the efficacy of data collection techniques, or the 
appropriateness of initial interpretations. 
Another approach, not yet tested, is to secure agreement from the 
contending parties that all modeling and predictions will be based 
upon a common data pool. In effect, this would mean that only one 
computer model would be constructed and that it would be con-
structed jointly. 
In many cases, differences can at least be narrowed. Potential im-
pacts can be predicted using a range of extremes. Experience has 
shown that somewhat different numbers or baseline data, assuming 
the range can be narrowed, will not yield significantly different fore-
casts. 
G. Step #7: Determining Fair Compensation and 
Possible Compensatory Actions 
If the options or elements of a project that can be bartered or 
traded are not made explicit, it is very difficult to reach a settlement. 
I t is not clear at the outset in most environmental disputes exactly 
how to specify appropriate or acceptable mitigation measures or 
79. See STRAUS & GREENBERG. supra note 78. 
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compensation. For example, if one group insists that losing any addi-
tional range land is absolutely out of the question and another group 
has a legitimate claim on that same land, but for purposes that would 
eliminate grazing, there is very little room for bargaining. The prob-
lem is to determine what each group is willing to trade. 
Perhaps those concerned about the preservation of the range will 
be willing to accept a deed for other land now in private hands or a 
sum of money that might be used to reclaim grazing land lost in past 
years. Unless and until compensatory actions can be specified, there 
is very little hope that a compromise can be reached. 
The task of calculating appropriate compensation or determining 
what trades or actions are equivalent to the losses caused by a pro-
ject is indeed difficult. Merely asking a group what it thinks its losses 
are worth will not produce an accurate estimate of the compensation 
that ought to be paid. Financial compensation is often inappropriate 
or unacceptable to certain groups. Off-site trades (swaps of land, 
preferential action on other matters, etc.) may be much more to the 
point. 
H. Step #8: Implementing the Bargains That are Made 
All the groups involved in bargaining must be made aware of the 
problems involved in implementing proposed cost compensation or 
impact mitigation measures. There are, sometimes, compromises 
that a group of disputants can reach that break a deadlock, but for 
reasons beyond their control cannot be implemented. There may be 
legal prohibitions or outside parties who refuse to cooperate.80 
Disputes that occur subsequent to a failure to implement a previous 
bargain are much harder to reconcile; all the parties to the bargain-
ing have good reason to doubt the prospects of fulfilling the 
agreements that are being proposed. It is absolutely crucial that all 
parties to a bargaining process accept and understand the obstacles 
to implementation when they attempt to reach closure on an issue. 
1. Step #9: Holding the Parties to Their Commitments 
It is critical to develop mechanisms that will bind all bargaining 
parties to the terms of their agreements. The participants must be 
confident that the agreements they have made are certain and that 
80. See part III, section D (Implementation), supra. 
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their "certainty" will be capable of objective measurement. At a 
minimum, this calls for agreements that are either self-enforcing 
(e.g., the Grayrocks Trust) or enforceable through legal means (con-
tract or tort) and some form(s) of monitoring to insure that 
predicted/prescribed outcomes do not exceed or drop below an-
ticipated levels. 
A number of traditional legal devices are sufficiently flexible to 
adapt to the particular needs of environmental dispute resolution. 
The trust example has already been explored.81 Contracts are an ob-
vious mechanism for ascertaining the rights and duties of the parties 
in complex agreements; they may be particularly useful in en-
vironmental agreements if they include elements of self-enforcement 
such as provisions for the forfeiture of bonds or liquidated damages 
clauses. As we will show later, many agreements may have the force 
of agency or court orders behind them, making the penalties for 
breach significantly more burdensome to the violating party. Such 
agreements would be difficult to flout. 
In addition to guarantees that an agreement is certain and en-
forceable, settlements will often require that predicted or prescribed 
impacts and outcomes be measured and monitored. There is ample 
precedent for such monitoring activities82 and provisions for their 
funding may be built into the final agreement. The parties' accept-
ance of the reliability of the monitoring data will sharply reduce the 
potential for subsequent challenges to the agreement. 
Even though the parties have reached a "solution" to their conflict 
and all that seems necessary is to formalize their settlement, it would 
be wrong to underestimate the importance of this last step in the 
dispute resolution process. Drafting a formal agreement provides 
the parties with an opportunity to reexamine past decisions in the 
light of subsequent developments and this may lead to dis-
agreements about supposedly "settled" questions. If the parties then 
change their minds or renege on agreements, it becomes even more 
difficult to rebuild a compromise since the parties will now be extra-
ordinarily suspicious of one another. Thus, the formalization of a set-
tlement into a written agreement is anything but a pro forma chore. 
Great care must be taken so that agreements do not evaporate at the 
moment of apparent success. 
81. See text at notes 33-37 supra. 
82. An example of such monitoring is the Grayrocks Dam Controversy. See notes 33-37 
supra and accompanying text. 
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J. Conclusion 
These steps toward environmental dispute resolution have been 
presented sequentially. In fact, during the course of most disputes, it 
is necessary to juggle the steps, looping back to re-evaluate the out-
come of an earlier decision or to reconsider the wayan earlier step 
was handled. In addition, the order in which the steps are addressed 
can be flexible; the list presented above is portrayed in an idealized 
fashion. 
V. ADDRESSING REMAINING PROBLEMS 
An effective theory of environmental dispute resolution would 
allow us to know which factors in a particular dispute were crucial, 
which techniques would have the best chance of "working," and 
when consensual approaches might not be appropriate. The practice 
of environmental dispute resolution is still too primitive to provide 
empirical support for such a theory. A great deal more experimenta-
tion and careful reflection are needed. 
Can we learn to spot "negotiable" disputes?83 How should bargain-
ing proceed? Is there a general way of approaching environmental 
disputes-as we have suggested-or is each conflict so special that it 
is amenable to resolution only on its own particular terms? We are 
not prepared at this time to answer these basic questions. However, 
we have considered two steps that might be taken now that would be 
helpful: (1) defining more clearly the role and responsibilities of en-
vironmental mediators, and (2) exploring the advantages and 
possibilities of direct government participation in environmental 
dispute resolution. 
A. Defining the Role and Responsibilities of the Mediator 
If mediation does become more a matter of course, or even if it 
happens only infrequently when major conflicts have reached a terri-
ble impasse, guidelines are needed to ensure that mediation efforts 
83. Preliminary studies on the nature of disputes that can be resolved through third party 
intervention are underway; see AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC., THE POTENTIAL OF 
MEDIATION FOR RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES RELATED TO ENERGY FACILITIES at 
21.26 (December 1979) (prepared for the Policy Analysis Division, U.S. Dep't of Energy), 
citing RESOLVE, CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION. THRESHOLD CRITERIA 
FOR USE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT (1980) and AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CRITERIA FOR SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION (1980). 
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are structured properly and that the responsibilities of the mediator 
are clear. At present, there are few prescriptions and no code of 
ethics to guide ad hoc mediation efforts. 84 
The mediator operates without the benefit of any higher authority 
that can force the parties to keep meeting or that can impose sanc-
tions on one of the parties if agreements are breached. However, 
even though the mediator has no power to force a settlement, his 
other efforts can facilitate agreement if an atmosphere of trust and 
cooperation can be established. The perception of the mediator's 
neutrality is critical-it allows a bond of trust to develop between the 
mediator and the parties involved. This bond of trust enables the 
mediator to receive confidential messages from the stakeholders; 
these, in turn, provide clues about the direction that bargaining must 
take in order to achieve a settlement. The various possible functions 
of a mediator should be evaluated in light of the need to maintain this 
bond. 
Simkin suggests that the mediator must perform procedural func-
tions, communications functions, and, in some cases, play an affirm-
ative or substantive role.85 Each of these functions carries a dif-
ferent level of risk of violating the bond of trust or losing the image 
of neutrality. Procedural functions, which include scheduling and 
recessing meetings, arranging joint and separate meetings, chang-
ing the location of meetings, chairing meetings and maintaining 
order, proposing a discussion sequence, keeping records, and impos-
ing deadlines,86 rarely present much of a threat to the neutral role of 
the mediator. Communications functions can include facilitating 
communication between meetings, determining the areas of agree-
ment through confidential talks with each side, signalling each side 
regarding the rigidity of their demands, and indicating how a 
bargain might be struck may cause problems by inviting attempts at 
84. This may change rapidly. There are a growing number of groups involved in en-
vironmental dispute resolution, including: American Arbritration Association Research In-
stitute, 140 West 51st Street, New York, NY 10020; Center for Urban and Regional Research, 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23508; Environmental Mediation International, Suite 
801, 2033 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; Office of Environmental Mediation, 
University of Washington, FM-12, Seattle, WA 98195; Project on Environmental Conflict, 
Upper Midwest Council, Federal Reserve Bank Building, Minneapolis, MN 55480; RESOLVE, 
Center for Environmental Conflict Resolution, 360 Bryant Street, Palo Alto, CA 94301; ROM-
COE (Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment), 5500 Central Ave. Suite A, Boulder, CO 
80301; Wisconsin Center for Public Policy, Environmental Mediation Project, 1605 Monroe 
Street, Madison, WI 53711. 
85. See SIMKIN, supra note 77, at 77. 
86. [d. 
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manipulation.87 Through these communication functions, a biased 
mediator can exert a substantial influence on the direction or out-
come of bargaining. Manipulation, if discovered (or even perceived), 
will undermine the mediation effort and destroy the credibility of the 
mediator. Presumably, these are sufficient inhibitions, and will serve 
to discourage the mediator from exercising communication functions 
in a way that will undermine his attempts to gain the trust of the 
various parties. 
However, there may be occasions where a mediator is tempted to 
take a more active role. For example, a mediator with previous ex-
perience may be able to offer creative suggestions based on the out-
come of similar disputes. This raises a point of some controversy. 
More substantial participation by the mediator in the details of 
the bargaining suggests an ever greater risk of manipulation: 
"mediation can attempt to deflate extreme bargaining positions, but 
since these positions often form part of a negotiating strategy, this 
action can compromise the perception of the mediator's neutral-
ity."88 
Simkin urges mediators to minimize their active participation in 
the substance of settlement. If the role of the mediator increases, the 
parties to the dispute may attempt to manipulate the mediator for 
their own strategic ends. This would undercut the mediator's effec-
tiveness. 
Other proponents of environmental mediation have argued that 
mediators should play an active role in identifying the parties to a 
dispute, arranging for their meetings and helping to sort (and even 
evaluate) the validity of technical information regarding the issues at 
stake.89 This undoubtedly makes the job of the mediator in environ-
mental disputes much more complex than the job of the mediator in 
more typical collective bargaining situations. 
To whom is the environmental mediator accountable? This ques-
tion is foremost in the minds of some attorneys who have raised 
doubts about the efficacy of environmental mediation.9o If mediation 
87. [d.; see also C. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION (1963); T. 
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); M. DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: 
CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES (1977). 
88. See T. Sullivan, Negotiation-Based Review Processes for Facility Siting (January 1980) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University). 
89. See Susskind, The Importance of Citizen Participation and Consensus-Building in the 
Land Use Planning Process: The Alewife Case (October 1977) (paper prepared for the Lincoln 
Institute Land Use Symposium, Cambridge, MA). 
90. Statement of Charles Halpern, Director, Institute for Public Interest Representation, at 
a conference sponsored by the Environmental Law Institute at Reston, Virginia, November 
30-December 1,1978: "The Environmental Impact Statement Process Under NEPA-III." 
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proceeds under court auspices, some of the problems of accountabili-
ty would be diminished. However, since the mediation arrangements 
discussed in this paper are voluntary, the mediator is only responsi-
ble to the participating parties and not to a court or government 
agency. Of course, it is possible for mediation to proceed under the 
auspices of an accredited organization such as the American Arbitra-
tion Association. If this were the case, then their code of ethics 
would bind the mediator.91 However, in most instances, ad hoc 
mediation will probably not involve "accredited" mediators, at least 
not in the near future. Instead, the accountability of mediators will 
probably be governed by the fact that they will be in highly visible, 
political positions. Their success will depend on their ability to main-
tain a bond of trust with the participants-this, in turn, will require 
them to behave in a manner consistent with codes applicable to 
elected and appointed public officials. With additional experience, it 
should be possible to codify a more specific ethical code appropriate 
to environmental dispute resolution. 
B. The Role of Courts and Agencies in Environmental 
Dispute Resolution 
We believe that judges should acknowledge the potential benefits 
of ad hoc bargaining processes for resolving environmental disputes 
and consider their use in appropriate cases. We also believe that the 
direct involvement of federal and state regulatory agencies in the 
bargaining process would help to address many of the problems in-
herent in environmental dispute resolution. 
The ability of the courts to deal with "polycentric problems"-
problems in which a large number of results are possible and many 
interests and values are involved-has long been questioned.92 We 
have suggested that environmental disputes are just such problems 
and often exceed the decision-making capacity of the courts. When 
faced with a complex environmental dispute, judges should consider 
negotiation or mediation to be a valuable addition to traditional pro-
cedures and, at a minimum, support any movement in that direction 
by the parties. In our view, of course, an even more active judicial 
role would be welcome; for example, involving the court in the selec-
tion and supervision of a mediator. 
Such a role for the courts is amply supported by precedent. Judges 
91. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMER-
CIAL DISPUTES (1977). 
92. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404 
(1979). 
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normally preside over the settlement of cases by stipulation and 
agreement of the parties. We are suggesting no more than an expan-
sion of this traditional role to include a judicial supervision of the 
mediator and an increased willingness of judges to endorse bargain-
ing processes to the parties at the pre-trial stage. 
Where government agencies are parties to litigation, courts can 
look for guidance to the antitrust consent order process, an example 
of a successful bargaining procedure to resolve complex disputes. 
The civil proceedings brought by the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice are typically resolved by negotiation rather 
than adjudication.93 In essence, an antitrust consent decree is a con-
tractual settlement to litigation; however, the courts treat the con-
sent order as a "judicial act" rather than a contract.94 If courts chose 
to treat the contractual settlement of environmental disputes 
similarly, a significant element of certainty could be added to 
negotiated agreements: the participation of agencies in a negotiation 
process that, after settlement, is considered a "judicial act" would 
squarely address the implementation problem we noted earlier. 
Experienced practitioners of environmental dispute resolution 
agree that implementation problems are a major concern: parties 
may not have the legal authority to implement their agreement, 
novel agreements may pose difficult problems of interpretation 
when challenged, and disgruntled members of participating or-
ganizations may form "splinter groups" and seek to frustrate im-
plementation.95 
In the wide range of environmental disputes where agency 
jurisdiction is likely to be invoked, the participation of the agency in 
the bargaining process and settlement will make implementation 
more certain since the agency controls the very means of implemen-
tation. Agency participation can also help to insure implementation 
in other, less obvious, ways. 
93. See T. LINDSTROM & K. TIGHE. 1 ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES (1974); Kalodner, Consent 
Decrees as an Antitrust Enforcement Device, 23 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 277 (1978); Zimmer & 
Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements By Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employ-
ment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE L. J. 163. 
94. Id. 
95. Author's interviews with: Jane McCarthy, environmental mediation practitioner cur-
rently engaged in research for the American Arbitration Association, New York City, March 
2, 1979; David O'Connor, environmental mediation practitioner associated with Clark-
McGlennon Associates, Boston, March 8, 1979; John McGlennon, environmental mediation 
practitioner and former administrator of EPA Region I, Boston, March 15,1979. 
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Agency participation can foster implementation by assisting in the 
identification of all affected parties and assuring that they par-
ticipate in the bargaining process. Agency requirements for public 
participation in government decision-making, for example, provide 
government officials with a model for, and experience with, in-
cluding concerned parties in agency procedures. That experience 
may be transferred from formal to informal processes with little dif-
ficulty since the techniques for achieving participation-adequate 
notice and an opportunity to influence decisions-remain the same in 
both cases. 
Since the government is likely to participate in a number of dif-
ferent disputes over time, agency participation can also foster im-
plementation by introducing an element of the cyclical nature of col-
lective bargaining. Parties may be reluctant to frustrate implemen-
tation of a consensual settlement when they know that they-or 
others representing similar concerns-may have to deal with the 
same official or agency in the future. 
Government participation can also add to the bargaining process a 
party whose mandate is to serve the general public interest rather 
than a particular interest group. In environmental disputes, it is not 
unusual to find that all the parties identify their position with the 
"public interest";96 however, because each party really serves only 
its own vision of the public good, an agreement, while satisfactory to 
the bargaining parties, will not necessarily be concerned with more 
general, or diffuse, concerns. While no one, including government, 
can truly claim to know what will maximize the general welfare, the 
government is at least pledged to attempt to work towards the well-
being of the whole society. Government participation, at least in 
those cases where the agency or official enjoys some degree of public 
trust, can thus enhance the bargaining process by providing the 
public with some assurance that an agreement will serve general, as 
well as particular, interests. 
Agency participation in bargaining may also help to address a sec-
ond aspect of the "public interest" problem. A government agency, 
before agreeing to participate in a bargaining effort, might seek to 
evaluate the adequacy and fidelity of organizational advocates-in a 
manner similar to that used by the federal courts in class actions97-
96. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 1764. 
97. See the discussion in id. at 1742-43. 
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and make its participation contingent on each advDcate's ability to 
meet a threshold standard of accountability.98 
We have already noted the extreme difficulties posed when one 
group sees itself as the advocate of the "public interest." But even 
here, government participation may encourage the parties to take a 
broader view of their position. When one party stresses the 
"rightness" of its position, it may prove helpful if a government of-
ficial, rather than the opposing party, notes that there are valid and 
competing interests opposed. 
The participation of government in the bargaining process can also 
address some of the other special problems associated with en-
vironmental disputes. Regulatory agencies, for example, can provide 
resources and expertise in clarifying the difficult factual disputes 
that mark environmental conflicts. Funding for environmental 
dispute resolution efforts, a significant problem in the past,99 may 
also be less difficult if agency resources are available. In many cases, 
agency personnel may be able to provide information and advice 
which might otherwise have to be purchased at a great expense. 
Agencies can also be helpful with "boundary" problems since they 
operate at a state or federal level and can transcend the limitations 
on decision making faced by local, private parties. 
A crucial threshold question in this inquiry is, of course, whether 
an agency would choose to initiate or otherwise become involved in 
negotiations. Some agencies, in the past, have chosen to participate 
in "formal" negotiating efforts;100 similarly, "informal" negotiation 
is a common element of agency practice at all levels of government. 
However, a question remains as to whether we can expect agencies 
to participate routinely in bargaining to resolve environmental con-
flict. 
Certainly, there are reasons not to get involved. Because negotia-
tion and mediation, at least at the outset, will be perceived as novel 
procedures, the agency that participates in a bargaining effort-
even if court-supervised-may lay itself open to charges that it is ex-
ceeding its legitimate authority. Critics may claim that the agency is 
shirking its duty-particularly in enforcement actions-and, rather 
than attempting to make "deals" with those who violate environ-
98. Such a policy was successfully adopted by Gerald Cormick in his mediation of the Sno-
qualmie/Snohomish dispute; see Cormick, supra note 11. 
99. See ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION. supra note 11, at 21-25. 
100. See "Conversion to Coal at Brayton Point," (October, 1978) (Final Report to the New 
England Energy Task Force); Environmental Mediation, NEWSWEEK. March 17, 1980 at 79. 
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mental laws, should be seeking to enforce the law in the manner of-
ficially prescribed. Further, the agency may risk charges that a 
bargaining effort shows that it has been "captured" by the very in-
terests it is supposed to be regulating. lol 
Agency officials may also be hesitant about offending powerful, 
elected officials who influence policy, control agency resources 
through the budget process, and suggest appointments. When an 
agency participates in a large-scale bargaining effort involving 
numerous parties, its activities may be perceived by some elected of-
ficials as an intrusion on their own political "turf": they may view 
such activities as just the sort of political "log-rolling" which they 
believe to be their private bailiwick. 
Agency officials may also be reluctant to participate in bargaining 
because it involves a lessened role for themselves. Rather than being 
the central figure in a formal process, with attendant media 
coverage throwing a spotlight on agency personnel, the official finds 
himself engaged in "behind-the-scenes" discussions where discre-
tion, not publicity, is the rule. Further, in a consensual process, the 
agency official neither sits in judgment nor enforces the law (both 
positions of power and prestige); instead, he becomes merely another 
actor in an often frustrating and tedious process with no guarantee 
of success. 
To make matters worse, even though the agency is only one party 
to the bargaining process, because of its high "visibility" it risks be-
ing held solely responsible for an unpopular agreement or blamed if 
negotiations break down. An agency may also find it extremely dif-
ficult to exit from bargaining sessions, no matter how reasonable the 
action might be, without being accused of damaging the prospects 
for settlement. 
There are, of course, also advantages to participation. The major 
advantage to the agency of informal bargaining is that it can achieve 
consensus and voluntary compliance. Agreement among all the af-
fected parties minimizes the risks of extended conflict, potentially 
adverse publicity, and the severe drain on agency resources that 
often arises out of the adversary mode of formal regulatory proc-
esses.102 Voluntary compliance with agency rules also makes the 
agency look reasonable and creates a strong impression of com-
petency and capable leadership. 
101. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 1685; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 11-14 (1965). 
102. See Breyer, supra note 24, at 582-83; Stewart, supra note 21, at 1772. 
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Bargaining is attractive to the courts also because it makes it 
easier to tailor different settlements to the special needs presented 
by an individual case and thus both encourages voluntary compliance 
(the regulatee gets a "better deal" through bargaining than was 
possible through the formal process) and makes for better solutions 
(the "tailored" settlement, not being bound to the more restricted 
and less flexible procedures of the formal process, has the potential 
for an innovative or localized solution that benefits both the general 
public and the regulatee more than a traditional approach). 
In many cases, of course, agency/court participation in bargaining 
would have little impact on the problematic nature of environmental 
conflict. Where environmental disputes are marked by extreme 
ideological differences it is unlikely that bargaining-or, for that 
matter, anything at all-can convince the contending parties to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of each other's concerns. Government 
officials are not immune to confusing factual statements with value 
statements. Although their relative objectivity may be helpful in 
recognizing particularly egregious instances of fact-value confusion, 
they cannot provide value-neutral technical counsel.103 Where one 
party to a dispute believes it can win at little cost, or the contending 
parties have nothing to trade, bargaining will probably not ease the 
conflict. Furthermore, when environmental disputes become nar-
rowed to a yes/no choice about a "lumpy" project-for example, the 
decision to complete the Tellico Dam104-so that nothing remains to 
be exchanged, it is doubtful that the bargaining will prove helpful. 
But bargaining is a real possibility in the many environmental 
disputes that arise from the permitting, licensing, and funding deci-
sions made by federal, state, and local agencies. Disputes arise when 
agency decision makers are insensitive to the desires of stakeholders 
or when agency personnel insist that they are not empowered to 
negotiate in particular situations but are instead bound by general 
rules and policies. In fact, agency personnel almost always have ad-
ministrative discretion (i.e., they have the latitude to decide when to 
act, what public posture to take, what informal communications they 
will permit, what information they will reveal, what explanations 
they offer, etc.) and they are almost always in a position to negotiate 
with regulatees. By taking advantage of the discretion available to 
103. See L. JAFFE, supra note 101, at 25. 
104. See Carter Signs Bill Forcing Tellico Dam Completion, Washington Post, September 
26,1979 at A-2. 
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them, regulatory agencies could avoid many disputes and turn others 
into occasions for voluntary compliance. lOS The key to success is for 
agency personnel to admit that they are in a bargaining or negoti-
ating role>every time they attempt to license or regulate and to learn 
to bargain effectively. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our experience to date with new approaches to environmental 
dispute resolution has shown that environmental conflicts, while 
more complex and difficult to resolve than many social conflicts, are 
amenable to solution by ad hoc bargaining processes. Certainly, 
mediation and informal bargaining will not resolve all environmental 
conflicts. They will neither end litigation nor bring a halt to the con-
tinuing battle between environmental and developmental interests. 
Bargaining will not be applicable to all environmental disputes, 
perhaps not even to a great many, but these new approaches to envi-
ronmental dispute resolution offer enough promise to justify contin-
uing efforts to test out-of-court dispute resolution techniques. 
If government is to playa more active role in the ad hoc bargaining 
process, a great deal of thought needs to be given to the scope of 
agency discretion in settling conflict and the means for insuring that 
such discretion is not abused. There is room for concern whenever an 
expansion of discretionary power for government is proposed. The 
problem with discretionary power, of course, is that it may be exer-
cized arbitrarily and capriciously. But we must not confuse the ex-
istence of discretionary power with the abuse of discretionary 
power .106 Although we are proposing a greater discretionary role for 
agencies in environmental decision making, there are basic checks 
on the abuse of discretion in a consensual process. Contending par-
ties with vitally opposed interests are included in the process and 
their legitimate concerns will have to be addressed before settlement 
can be achieved. This provides a strong disincentive to agency ar-
bitrariness. 
What if the necessary representation of diverse interests is not 
105. Research into bargaining within the current regulatory process is now underway at 
MIT. The project-entitled Consensual Approaches to the Enforcement of Environmental 
Standards-is funded by EPA and will examine bargaining in a number of regulatory settings, 
including: rulemaking, permitting, review of planning grants, and review of state implementa-
tion programs. 
106. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 17 (1969). 
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present? Is there a check on an agency if it bargains with only a few 
hand-picked parties and then attempts to claim that the settlement 
represents a consensus of all interested parties? The answer is that 
such arbitrary behavior by the agency is inherently self-defeating. 
Agreements would invariably be attacked by excluded parties and 
the agency would lose all the advantages of informal bargaining-
particularly voluntary compliance-that we noted earlier. 
We also need to address the issues raised by court supervision of 
informal bargaining, especially in regard to judicial review of agency 
decisions. Should there be a review of the bargaining process or the 
settlement? Both? Neither? How can there be any review of an in-
formal, and perhaps confidential, procedure? If settlements are re-
viewed, what is the standard for review? It is not immediately appar-
ent that judicial review of the substance of agency decisions would 
have any purpose where consensual processes are at work; and, in 
fact, courts have generally adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards 
consent decrees, nearly always holding them immune from third par-
ty attack. 107 
One possible approach to this entire set of issues is to require that 
agencies "structure" their participation in informal bargaining 
through clear statements of the rules to be applied, with courts then 
empowered to review agency actions to determine whether these 
rules have been followed. lOS For example, an agency should be able 
to state its rules for admission of parties to the bargaining process. 
Upon challenge by an excluded party, the court could determine 
whether the agency had followed its announced procedures for ad-
mission. All such prospective rules could be fully reviewable as ad-
ministrative procedures, allowing the reviewing court to exert 
"checks" on the agency's "structuring" of its own discretion. 
Many more questions remain. Will there be a need for statutory 
revision to foster government participation in bargaining? If so, is 
amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act the correct ap-
proach or would it be preferable to alter the procedures mandated by 
substantive statutes? What factors distinguish "negotiable" dis-
putes? We also need to know much more about the role of mediation 
in the bargaining process. Mediation is often the last opportunity for 
settlement, yet, at present, we know very little about what consti-
tutes effective practice. 
107. See Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 93, at 208. 
108. See DAVIS. supra note 106, at 55-56. 
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The next step is to experiment with and document dispute resolu-
tion efforts, encourage government participation in these efforts, 
and begin to fund research and practice in the field. A great deal re-
mains to be learned. 
